di Chiara Amalfitano

SOMMARIO: 1.1. Qualche premessa: il rapporto tra ordinamenti e tra giudici (“comune”, costituzionale, dell'Unione) nella prospettiva della Corte di giustizia... – 1.2. …e nella prospettiva della Corte costituzionale. – 2.1. Qualche riflessione sparsa. L’impostazione del “tono costituzionale” rispetta le condizioni Melki e Abdeli (della giurisprudenza di Lussemburgo)? – 2.2. Il giudice di ultima istanza, l’obbligo di rinvio pregiudiziale, il dovere (secondo la Corte di giustizia) o la facoltà (secondo la Consulta) di disapplicare e la (stringente) opportunità di sollevare una questione di costituzionalità: come comporre il puzzle? – 2.3. La perdita di centralità dell’art. 11 Cost. quale «sicuro fondamento» del diritto UE nell’ordinamento nazionale: quali possibili conseguenze? – 3. Granital è davvero definitivamente superata?

In light of the most recent constitutional case law, this essay examines the role of the ordinary courts today, between non-application, preliminary reference to the Court of Justice and referral to the Constitutional Court. It highlights the critical issues of the new model of relations between courts and between the Italian and EU legal systems insofar as it risks implying systematic recourse to the Constitutional Court and an equally systematic refusal to disapply domestic law that conflicts with EU law. It reaffirms the central role of the ordinary courts in ensuring the principle of the primacy of EU law and explores the possibility of reconciling the Granital doctrine with the Constitutional Court’s new approach.

di Eloisa M.B. Bellucci

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction. – 1.1. Recent Practice on Terrorism Exceptions. – 2. Terrorism Exceptions’ Litigation Under the Lens of Customary International Law on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State. – 2.1. Terrorism Exceptions and Adjudicative Jurisdiction. – 2.1.1. Terrorism Exceptions as Humanitarian Exceptions. – 2.1.2. Terrorism Exceptions as Territorial Tort Exceptions. – 2.1.3. Terrorism Exceptions and the Counter-limits Doctrine. – 2.2. Terrorism Exceptions and Enforcement Jurisdiction. – 3. Terrorism Exceptions and the Plea of State Immunity for Non-judicial Acts. – 3.1. Terrorism Exceptions Beyond State Immunities. In Brief. – 4. Conclusion.

This paper investigates the legality of terrorism exceptions to State immunities under customary international law. Building upon the Alleged Violations of State Immunities (Islamic Republic of Iran v. Canada) case, it aims to address two questions: (i) whether terrorism exceptions constitute valid derogations from State immunities in judicial proceedings and (ii) whether immunity may be invoked outside litigation, in response to foreign countries’ legislative or administrative measures, such as the adoption of laws introducing terrorism exceptions and the designation of a State as a sponsor of terrorism. It will be argued that terrorism exception-based litigation lacks sufficient grounding in customary international law. It will be further contended that, while immunities strictly apply to adjudicative jurisdiction and post-judgment measures of constraints, the principle of sovereign equality may nevertheless provide a legal basis for challenging non-judicial measures such as the enactment of terrorism exceptions and the designation of a State as a sponsor of terrorism.

di Giorgia Berrino

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. I crimini di guerra contro i beni culturali nello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale: tecnica di incriminazione e fattispecie rilevanti. – 3. L’adeguamento incompiuto dell’ordinamento italiano allo Statuto di Roma e le sue conseguenze. – 4. Una selva di norme? La legislazione italiana per la repressione dei crimini di guerra contro i beni culturali. – 4.1. Le previsioni del codice penale militare di guerra. – 4.2. La disciplina extracodicistica prevista dalla l. n. 45 del 16 aprile 2009. – 4.3. Le nuove disposizioni introdotte nel codice penale a tutela dei beni culturali. – 5. Le (abortite) prospettive di riforma. – 6. Osservazioni conclusive

The paper examines the capacity of the Italian legal system to ensure the repression of war crimes against cultural property as provided for by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. After recalling and analysing the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, it highlights the shortcomings of the current Italian legislative framework. Although Italian law includes several provisions that may be used to prosecute war crimes against cultural property, their application is marked by fragmentation, overlaps, and interpretative uncertainty. The paper ultimately advocates for the full implantation of the Rome Statute by Italy, which, by overcoming the existing normative dispersion, would guarantee substantively effective criminal protection.

di Caterina Di Costanzo

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. Sicurezza e Costituzione: profili evolutivi di un concetto. – 3. Decretazione d’urgenza e sicurezza: la recente prassi legislativa. – 3.1. La prassi dei decreti sicurezza: linee di sviluppo e criticità. – 3.1.1. I primi interventi: le misure del 2008-2010. – 3.1.2. Il decreto sicurezza del 2017: il consolidarsi di un paradigma multilivello. – 3.1.3. Il decreto sicurezza del 2018: il ritorno a un modello securitario centralista e le censure della Corte in materia di valorizzazione dei principi di sussidiarietà e leale collaborazione. – 4. Sicurezza e casi straordinari di necessità ed urgenza: in conclusione, una contraddizione in termini?

This paper examines the use of decree-laws in the field of public security in the Italian legal system and assesses their compatibility with constitutional principles. Building on the constitutional case law that has progressively shaped security as a systemic, multilevel, and multidimensional sector, the article reconstructs the legislative practice of the so-called security decrees from the 2000s to the most recent interventions. The analysis highlights critical issues related to the normalization of emergency legislation, the weakening of the requirements of extraordinary necessity and urgency, and the frequent lack of substantive homogeneity. Particular attention is paid to the tension between decree-law instruments and a conception of security that calls for coordination, prevention, and the involvement of territorial autonomies. The paper concludes by questioning the “constitutional sustainability” of this practice and by stressing the need for comprehensive, constitutionally grounded security policies.

di Ana F. Neves

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction. – 2. Data and diagnosis of judicial independence in Portugal. – 3. The legal framework for judicial independence and its flaws. – 4. The need for cross-cutting reform of a judicial system embedded in multiple conflicts of interest. – 5. Conclusion.

Over the past decade, some EU Member States have faced challenges to judicial independence and there have been significant developments in legal standards driven by European case law. Such challenges result from the enactment of laws that have deliberately sought to undermine judicial independence, accompanied by institutional changes involving key players within the judicial structure itself. In contrast, the issue of insufficient judicial independence in Portugal has evolved through a subtle trajectory rooted in systemic and mutually reinforcing factors. This situation reflects institutional anomie concerning judicial independence, thereby undermines the prospects for significant reform. The result is a judicial system that is ineffective and unreliable, even for members of the judiciary.

di Edoardo Spataro

SOMMARIO: 1. La nozione di confluenza del decreto-legge. Dalla regolarità alla regola – 1.1. Un concetto oscillante – 1.2. Due gemelli diversi: confluenza e conversione mascherata – 1.3. Un elemento ricorsivo della confluenza: le leggi a data certa come fonti di destinazione – 1.4. Ci può essere confluenza senza abrogazione? – 1.5. Dalla prassi una nuova nozione – 2. I profili di dubbia legittimità costituzionale. La confluenza e la difficile relazione con l’art. 77 Cost. – 2.1. L’abrogazione del decreto-legge confluito come mancata conversione – 2.2. Il tentato aggiramento del sindacato di legittimità costituzionale – 2.3. Oltre i limiti del potere di conversione delle Camere – 3. Le cause della confluenza. Le ragioni della patologia nel rapporto tra Governo e Parlamento – 3.1. L’impatto del CoViD-19 – 3.2. La quiete dopo la tempesta. Cosa resta della confluenza dopo il piccolo pandemico – 3.3. Conclusioni

The essay aims to achieve a new definition of the confluence of decree-laws, piecing together its historical evolution since 2006. Constantly referring to the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court, the paper highlights the plausible profiles of constitutional illegitimacy of this distorted practice. The confluence of decree-laws is also inquired into its causes, with special reference to CoViD-19 pandemic.