di Nicola Lupo

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione: un terzo, atteso e cospicuo, pacchetto di riforme del regolamento della Camera. – 2. Aumentano le simmetrie tra Camera e Senato, in ulteriore attuazione del monito di cui alla sentenza n. 35 del 2017. – 2.1. La Camera recupera due legislature perse, senza riforme regolamentari. – 2.2. La Camera adotta discipline analoghe, o comunque più vicine a quelle del Senato. – 2.3. Si sviluppano le procedure bicamerali concordate (tra le Giunte per il regolamento e tra i Presidenti di Assemblea). – 3. Tuttavia, non poche asimmetrie persistono, e qualcun’altra ne nasce. – 4. Conclusioni. L’ineludibile questione delle commissioni permanenti, alla vigilia della XX legislatura repubblicana.

The article – which introduces the special section on the reform of the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies approved in February 2026, and which partly draws on a lecture delivered at the "Silvano Tosi" Seminar of Parliamentary Studies – analyzes the effects that the reform may determine on the interpretation and practice of Italian bicameralism. It adopts a perspective that apperas unavoidable, especially in light of the repeated failures of the constitutional amendments aimed at introducing an asymmetrical bicameral system. This is all the more evident after the Constitutional Court, in the well-known warning and obiter dictum concluding judgment no. 35 of 2017, invited, in the light of the outcome of the constitutional referendum of 2016, to adopt similar electoral systems for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, so as not to jeopardize the proper functioning of the parliamentary form of government. This also implies – albeit implicitly, but clearly – avoiding the introduction of further institutional incentives for divergence between the two Houses of Parliament, such as those that might arise from unnecessarily inconsistent parliamentary rules of procedure. After recalling that the reform represents the third package adopted in the current legislative term and that it will enter into force only with the new one, the article notes that, overall, symmetry between the Chamber and the Senate has increased. This is due, first, to the fact that the Chamber has effectively caught up after two legislative terms without reforms of its rules of procedure; second, because in several areas it has adopted provisions similar, or at least closer, to those in force at the Senate; and third, because a set of coordinated bicameral procedures has been foreseen (between the Committees for the rules of procedure and between the Presidents of the Assembly). However, it should be observed that many asymmetries still persist, and some new ones have emerged: this is particularly evident with regard to the minutes, which are eliminated only in the Chamber. In conclusion, attention is drawn to what is considered the most significant asymmetry, namely that concerning the number and the articulation of the standing committees.

di Frédéric Piccoli

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. Niente di nuovo sul fronte dei gruppi ‘ordinari’ della Camera dei deputati. – 3. Alcune (importanti) correzioni alla disciplina della Camera dei deputati relativa ai gruppi autorizzati in deroga. – 3.1. «Di norma» almeno sette deputati: l’abile compromesso sul requisito numerico dei gruppi in deroga, cui garantire una rappresentanza piena nelle Commissioni. – 3.2. Un gruppo in deroga per le minoranze linguistiche anche alla Camera dei deputati. – 4. Le norme antitrasformismo, tuttavia. – 4.1. I disincentivi personali alla mobilità parlamentare: le nuove ipotesi di decadenza da determinate cariche. – 4.2. I disincentivi economici alla mobilità parlamentare e alla formazione dei gruppi nel corso della legislatura: la nuova disciplina dei contributi finanziari ai gruppi parlamentari. – 5. Cenni conclusivi: una riforma dei gruppi parlamentari che «c’è ma non si vede».

The reform of the Chamber of Deputies’ Rules of Procedure, approved on 17 February 2026, brought the Chamber’s rules closer to those of the Senate in many areas, without, however, adapting the rules concerning the formation of parliamentary groups. This article specifically examines the few changes adopted with regard to parliamentary groups and reflects on the disincentives approved to address parliamentary fragmentation and political party switching.

di Renato Ibrido

SOMMARIO: 1. Una riforma nata vecchia e nata male. – 2. Un’ulteriore accelerazione al procedimento legislativo “più veloce al mondo”. – 3. Il c.d. “voto a data certa” nel nuovo art. 69 Reg. Cam. – 4. Il contingentamento dei tempi dell’esame dei disegni di legge di conversione dei decreti-legge (art. 154 Reg. Cam.). – 5. Un pacchetto di modifiche nel migliore dei casi inutile e nel peggiore controproducente. – 6. Una democrazia più veloce, ma meno solida: verso una conclusione.

This paper examines the 2026 reform of the Italian Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure, specifically analyzing the "date-certain vote" and time-contingency mechanisms. The author argues that these changes, while intended to encourage ordinary legislative paths over emergency decrees, are fundamentally flawed and outdated from the outset due to their late implementation and structural imbalance. Rather than revitalizing Parliament, the reform risks further accelerating decision-making to the Government's advantage while providing only superficial gains for the opposition. Ultimately, the study suggests that true parliamentary strengthening requires deeper electoral reforms and a comprehensive recodification of parliamentary law.

di Lavinia Ialongo

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. Razionalizzazione del procedimento legislativo in sede referente. – 2.1 I (nuovi) poteri del Presidente di Commissione nella programmazione dei lavori. – 2.2 Gli effetti del parere della Commissione bilancio ex articolo 81, comma 3, della Costituzione. – 2.3 Codificazione dell’istituto della segnalazione degli emendamenti. – 2.4 La certezza dei tempi di presentazione degli emendamenti c.d. “fuori sacco” e delle riformulazioni. – 2.5 Le nuove frontiere della pubblicità dei lavori. – 3. Il Comitato per la legislazione tra qualità della normazione e valutazione di impatto delle politiche pubbliche. – 4. Conclusioni.

The third reform of the Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure, broader in scope than the previous two, was approved on 17th February 2026, almost thirty years after the last comprehensive amendment. Among the fields of intervention identified by the Committee on the Rules of Procedure, this paper focuses on the streamlining of parliamentary work through the strengthening of the role of parliamentary committees, as well as on enhancing the functions of the Committee for Legislation with regard to legislative quality and regulatory impact assessment. The reform will come into force from the next legislature and the aim is that the innovations analyzed in this paper, when considered alongside the other strands of reform, may help restore a central role to Parliament as the privileged locus of law-making.

di Luca Bartolucci

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione: i procedimenti parlamentari come “giunture” del sistema parlamentare euro-nazionale – 2. La genesi e i contenuti della riforma sulle procedure di raccordo con l’Unione europea – 3. Le novità in materia di esame degli atti dell’Unione europea – 4. La codificazione delle “procedure sperimentali” sul controllo di sussidiarietà – 5. Il rafforzamento della XIV Commissione – 6. La nuova disciplina di esame della legge di delegazione europea – 7. Ulteriori interventi in materia – 8. Conclusioni: si sarebbe potuto osare un po’ di più?.

The article examines the amendments introduced by the so-called “third package” of reforms to the Rules of Procedure of the Italian Chamber of Deputies concerning coordination with the European Union, interpreting parliamentary procedures as “junctions” within the Euro-national parliamentary system. After reconstructing the delay in adapting parliamentary rules to the innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and Law No. 234 of 2012, it analyses the origins and main directions of the reform, highlighting its function in codifying experimental practices and strengthening the role of the XIV Committee (European Union Policies). Particular attention is paid to the scrutiny of European Union acts, the formalization of subsidiarity control, and the new procedures governing the examination of the European delegation law.