di Marco Bassini

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. La discussa forma costituzionale degli executive orders. – 3. Gli executive orders nei primi mesi della seconda presidenza Trump. – 4. Un uso strategico e in funzione legittimante degli executive orders? – 5. Conclusioni.

This article explores the unprecedented use of executive orders by President Trump during the early months of his second term, focusing on the constitutional and political implications of this practice. It examines the legal nature of executive orders within the framework of the U.S. separation of powers, highlighting their ambiguous normative status and the historical tensions they generate between the executive and legislative branches. By analyzing both the content and strategic function of the most relevant executive orders—particularly those affecting civil rights, immigration, education, and abortion—the article investigates how Trump seeks to consolidate presidential power and challenge congressional authority. Special attention is given to the weakening of judicial remedies, especially following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. CASA, which limited the scope of nationwide injunctions. The article ultimately reflects on the risks posed to democratic balance by an expansive interpretation of the unitary executive theory and the potential drift toward a “counter-constitution”.

di Giammaria Gotti

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. La recente giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale sulla delegazione legislativa. – 3. Le «riforme normative di ampio respiro» del PNRR. Il decreto legislativo come strumento privilegiato per interventi ad alta valenza riformatrice. – 3.1 L’attuazione delle riforme abilitanti del PNRR. L’esempio del nuovo Codice dei contratti pubblici. – 4. Il caso della determinazione dei LEP nella legge n. 86/2024 e la sentenza n. 192/2024. Alcune precisazioni circa i limiti alla discrezionalità del Governo. – 5. Gli attuali confini del potere legislativo delegato: quali indicazioni per la forma di governo.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of recent trends affecting legislative delegation, both in light of the Constitutional Court’s case law on Article 76 of the Italian Constitution - which continues to delineate the boundaries of delegated legislative power - and in view of the recent activity of the national legislature, particularly following the National Recovery and Resilience Plan and certain key reforms promoted during the current parliamentary term. Numerous rulings of the Constitutional Court have addressed the matter, even in 2024 and the first half of 2025 alone. In particular, three recent judgments - Nos. 22, 98, and 192 of 2024 - have upheld challenges of constitutional legitimacy based on Article 76 of the Constitution. Such an analysis proves important in identifying the current limits of legislative delegation as outlined by the Court, limits that are essential for accurately situating legislative decrees within the hierarchy of sources of law, with clear implications stemming from the recent transformations of their constitutional model on the form of government.

di Francesca Rosa

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. – 2. Una classificazione delle previsioni costituzionali sul potere normativo del Governo. – 2.1. Premessa. – 2.2. Il potere regolamentare. – 2.3. Il potere normativo delegato dal Parlamento. – 2.4. Il potere normativo originario. – 3. Le tendenze emergenti dalla prassi. – 3.1. Il ruolo condizionante della storia costituzionale e degli equilibri della forma di governo. – 3.2. La collocazione degli atti normativi del Governo nel sistema delle fonti. – 3.3. I dati sulla produzione normativa del Governo. – 3.3.1. Francia, Germania, Regno Unito e Spagna. – 3.3.2. Italia. – 3.4. Il controllo giurisdizionale sulla produzione normativa del Governo. – 3.5. Il controllo parlamentare sulla produzione normativa del Governo. – 4. Conclusioni.

Abstract: The essay offers a mapping of the themes and issues related to the exercise of the Government’s normative function in European countries where the legislative and executive branches are connected by a relationship of confidence. The examined European constitutions reflect the existence of a shared normative function between Parliament and Government. In particular, three distinct bases for conferring normative authority on the Government can be identified: a) the recognition of the power to adopt implementing regulations of statutes and, at times, a general regulatory power; b) the delegation of normative authority to the Government by Parliament; c) the attribution of an autonomous normative power to the Government, linked either to a specific area of competence or to the occurrence of situations of urgency, necessity, or emergency.
In each legal system, the Government’s role in exercising the normative function results from the combination of these different options and from the actual balance of power established between Parliament and Government. These considerations, together with data on the Government’s normative output, reveal the significant centrality of the executive in the production of legislation. This trend is consistent with the growing prominence of Governments within the power dynamics of contemporary systems of government—further reinforced in recent years by the debt crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. Within this framework, Italy holds a particularly distinctive position due to the Government’s prerogative to adopt two types of primary legislation—legislative decrees and law decrees—and the extensive use of both as a matter of practice.

di Renato Ibrido

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. Il fondamento del principio della simmetria fra Presidente del Parlamento in seduta comune e Regolamento applicabile. – 3. Una precondizione per ragionare di un Regolamento del Parlamento in seduta comune: l’adesione alla teoria della natura dichiarativa dell’autonomia regolamentare ex art. 64 Cost. – 4. Il problema dell’individuazione della “formazione” del Parlamento in seduta comune competente all’adozione del Regolamento. – 5. Il procedimento di formazione del Regolamento ed in particolare il nodo del quorum di approvazione nonché la questione della sua emendabilità. – 6. Il timing dell’approvazione del Regolamento del Parlamento in seduta comune alla luce del vincolo contenuto nell’art. 55, c. 2 Cost. – 7. Le alternative: un Regolamento “sul” Parlamento in seduta comune approvato a maggioranza assoluta dalla Camera dei deputati. – 8. Seconda alternativa: Regolamenti minori approvati dal Parlamento in seduta comune sulla base di una meta-norma contenuta nel Regolamento della Camera. – 9. Il Regolamento parlamentare per i procedimenti di accusa contro il Presidente della Repubblica. – 10. Verso una conclusione.

The Italian Constitution regulates the functions of Parliament in Joint Session and the most important aspects of its structure and organization. However, it says nothing expressly about the Rules of Procedure applicable to such a body.
In light of this potential regulatory gap – and engaging with the evolution of the scholarly debate and parliamentary practice – the essay will focus on a systemic issue that is partly influenced by the nature of Parliament in Joint Session and, in part, contributes to influencing that very nature: the matter of the Joint Session Parliament’s autonomy in adopting its own Rules of Procedure.

di Edoardo Caterina

SOMMARIO: 1. Coordinate costituzionali in materia di campagne elettorali. – 2. La legge n. 28 del 2000 e la sua obsolescenza tecnologica. – 3. La legge n. 515 del 1993 e la sua obsolescenza normativa. – 3.1. La mancanza di trasparenza circa i finanziamenti delle campagne elettorali. – 3.2. L’aggiramento della disciplina delle donazioni ai partiti politici. – 3.3. Il disallineamento con la nuova forma di governo regionale: a margine del caso Todde. – 4. Il nuovo Regolamento Ue sulla pubblicità politica: luci e ombre. – 5. La proposta di legge sull’impiego dell’IA nelle campagne elettorali. – 6. La mancanza di un unico organo di vigilanza sulle campagne elettorali. – 7. Conclusioni.

The contribution will first clarify the fundamental constitutional principles governing the regulation of election campaigns. In light of these principles, it will be seen how the current Italian legislation on election expenses relating to political election campaigns (Law No. 515 of 1993) is seriously outdated and largely ineffective, as will be demonstrated by a number of case studies. Similarly, Law No. 28 of 2000, which was designed for access to radio and television media, is largely inadequate for the new context of digital campaigning. The monitoring of compliance with the rules governing election campaigns is also at risk of being compromised by the lack of coordination between the large number of supervisory bodies involved. In contrast to a national legislative framework that has remained largely unchanged for 25 years, the European legislator has recently taken a highly innovative step with EU Regulation 2024/900 (on transparency and targeting of political advertising), has sought to ensure minimum levels of transparency in election campaigns by laying down specific rules for online election propaganda and prohibiting election funding from entities outside the Union. However, although the Regulation is not limited to European elections, it does not exempt national legislators from overcoming the current shortcomings in the regulatory framework.

di Filippo Pizzolato

SOMMARIO: 1. Lo scarto tra i principi costituzionali e il sistema delle fonti. – 2. Fonti di autonomia e partecipazione. – 3. La mediazione legislativa: il Tuel. – 4. La mediazione legislativa: oltre (e prima de) il Tuel. – 5. Partecipazione e disciplina delle funzioni. – 6. Il “caso” dell’amministrazione condivisa.

The contribution analyses the complex interweaving of legislative and regulatory competences regarding civic participation at the local level. The reflection argues for the need to reform the "code of local autonomies", so that it could be more aligned with the constitutional recognition of the autonomy of municipalities. The recent story of shared administration allows to highlight the space for bottom-up autonomous discipline.

di Daniele Chinni

SOMMARIO: 1. Il poscritto della lettera del Presidente Napolitano sul c.d. decreto Englaro e l’esercizio del potere di emanazione. – 2. Storia di un (non) rifiuto. Il Presidente Pertini e la vicenda del giugno 1980. –– 3. Di una emanazione nonostante «gravi perplessità». Il Presidente Pertini e la vicenda del giugno 1981. – 4. «Soprassedere all’emanazione» o emanare nonostante «tutte le perplessità»? Il Presidente Cossiga e le vicende del luglio 1989 e del febbraio 1990. – 5. «Riesaminare l’intera questione». Il Presidente Scalfaro e la vicenda del marzo 1993. – 6. Dalle carte alla Carta: sul potere di rifiuto di emanazione del decreto-legge. – 6.1. I limiti al potere di rifiuto di emanazione. – 6.2. Presupposti del decreto-legge e rifiuto di emanazione.

In the first part of the essay, the author elaborates on the practice of the power of enactment by the Head of State, starting with the events recalled by President Napolitano in his letter to the President of the Council of Ministers on the Englaro case. The analysis is carried out on the basis of consultation of the documentation kept in the Archivio Storico della Presidenza della Repubblica, which allows a more careful interpretation of those cases, sometimes differing from the reconstructions offered by the mainstream literature.
In the second part of the essay, the author questions the constitutional intensity of the presidential control over the decree-law, claiming that the Head of State not only can request the Government to re-examine the decree, but can also refuse to issue it when constitutionally illegitimate, regardless of the seriousness of the defect.

di Andrea Conzutti

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione: uno sguardo alle possibili applicazioni dell’intelligenza artificiale nel procedimento legislativo. – 2. Prima applicazione: intelligenza artificiale e momento conoscitivo. – 3. Seconda applicazione: intelligenza artificiale e momento redazionale. – 4. Terza applicazione: intelligenza artificiale e momento partecipativo. – 5. Conclusioni: rinvigorire la funzione legislativa con un’intelligenza artificiale a vocazione istituzionale e complementare.

This article offers a critical analysis of the potential impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the Italian legislative process, with the aim of evaluating its capacity to revitalise the legislative function of Parliament.
The inquiry unfolds along three key dimensions through which AI technologies may affect the constitutional architecture of legislative decision-making: (i) the organisation and systematisation of informational flows essential to law-making; (ii) assistance in the drafting of legislative proposals; and (iii) the facilitation of civic engagement within the legislative process.
The article contends that, if purged of its most critical shortcomings, structurally embedded within parliamentary administration, and employed as an auxiliary mechanism respectful of the prerogatives of elected representatives, AI may contribute to strengthening the constitutional role of Parliament in the legislative cycle. In doing so, it could serve – albeit partially – as a corrective to the progressive marginalisation of Parliament vis-à-vis the growing prominence of the executive.