di Lara Lazzeroni

SOMMARIO: Premessa. – 1. Il contratto di prossimità al cospetto degli articoli 70 e seguenti della Costituzione. – 2. Il dimensionamento del contratto di prossimità fra le fonti del diritto. – 3. Equilibrismi ed incertezze regolative. – 4. Le dinamiche in atto nel cono d’ombra della Costituzione.

The essay proposes a reflection on systematization, among sources of law, of the so-called collective bargaining agreements of “proximity”, i.e. collective bargaining agreements entered into by companies or territorial bodies, that are allowed – by virtue of Art. 8, d.l. 138/2011, converted in law no. 148/2011 – to derogate in pejus many labor laws with erga omnes effect. Unexpectedly, the ten years use of Art. 8 leads the A. to develop an analysis about the limits that are being encountered (pursuant to Art. 70 and following of the Constitution) in conferring to a third subject a regulatory function, which can be held equivalent to the one of the law: an analysis about Art. 8 like a “legal rule” for a “law making process”. The reflection moves from the diversity of the regulatory models developed until 2011 (e.g. the 1959 Vigorelli law; the public labour reform law of ’93; or the de-legification regulations in general) in the attempt to highlight the anomalies of Art. 8 and, therefore, the anomalies of proximity contract. Such peculiarities entail in particular that the rule in question does not belong to so-called “fonti-atto” but still possesses its characteristics (such as the ability to innovate objective law and its resistance to repeal). At the same time, it should be excluded from the so-called “fonti-fatto”, in light of the general interests that it is called upon to pursue.

di Laura Magi

SOMMARIO:  1. Contenzioso strategico sui cambiamenti climatici e dottrina dell’atto politico: cenni introduttivi. – 2. Portata e natura degli obblighi di riduzione delle emissioni di gas serra. – 3. Brevi cenni sulla dottrina dell’atto politico. – 4. Quattro diverse risposte dei giudizi nazionali. – 4.1. Le decisioni delle corti olandesi nel caso Urgenda. – 4.2. Le decisioni delle corti irlandesi nel caso Friends of the environment. – 4.3. Le decisioni delle corti norvegesi nel caso People v Arctic Oil. – 4.4. Le decisioni delle corti statunitensi nel caso Juliana e quelle delle corti svizzere nel caso Klimaseniorinnen. – 5. Valutazione delle sentenze esaminate: tanto rumore per nulla! – 6. Separazione dei poteri e minaccia climatica: il giudice di fronte ad una scelta esistenziale.

The political question doctrine has recently been invoked as a defensive tool by several Governments in the framework of climate change litigation before national judges. Its employment deserves attention. Indeed, it is worth investigating whether it may hinder the achievement of goals that the environmental strategic litigation purses. Moreover, a clear-cut position of national courts as far as its application is concerned will give important elements to predict the degree of effectiveness of international law in the near future.

di Giovanni Di Cosimo

SOMMARIO: 1. Partiti digitali. – 2. Statuto 2017. – 3. Il modello e la realtà. – 4. Addio a Rousseau. – 5. Statuto 2021. – 6. Trasparenza. – 7. Regole autonome ed eteronome.

As is already the case in many other areas of collective life, digitalisation is now also pervading the organisation of political parties, to the extent that we speak of 'digital parties'. This raises the question of the rules that political groupings set for themselves regarding the use of digital technologies, and the self-regulation of their use in carrying out their activities. This article will focus on analysing the internal rules of the Italian "MoVimento 5 Stelle" party and assessing them on the basis of constitutional principles.

di Marta Picchi

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. – 2. I contenuti della Comunicazione. – 2.1. Condivisione dell’impegno per migliorare il processo regolatorio. – 2.2. Una migliore comunicazione con gli stakeholders e il pubblico in generale. – 2.3. Maggiore trasparenza. – 2.4. Nuovi strumenti di semplificazione e riduzione degli oneri amministrativi …. – 2.5. … e ottimizzazione di quelli esistenti. – 3. Riflessioni conclusive. – 3.1. L’approccio one in, one out fra innovazione, revirement e antiche questioni. – 3.2. Un rimedio controproducente per fronteggiare gli oneri della partecipazione.

This essay analyzes the recent Communication of the European Commission on better regulation, highlighting the continuity with the choices made previously. The essay gives an account of some solutions that will undoubtedly contribute to further improving the quality of the European Union’s regulatory sources. However, the focus is mainly on two innovative choices that could have counterproductive effects also based on the implementation that will be carried out.

di Viktor Zoltán Kazai

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduction. – 2. The necessity of a change of regime in 2022. – 2.1. Constraints imposed by Fidesz on the new governing majority. – 2.2. The significance of a symbolic rupture with the Orbán regime. – 3. The non-applicability of the procedural rules in force – 3.1. Legal basis: theoretical arguments. – 3.1.1. Invalidity of the Fundamental Law on procedural grounds. – 3.1.2. The ius resistendi argument. – 3.1.3. Institutionalized authoritarianism as an exemption from the adherence to formal rules. – 3.1.4. Regime-changing constitution-making. – 3.1.5. Popular authorization through elections. – 3.2. Fear from chaos and instability: practical considerations. – 4. Specific scenarios. – 4.1. The invalidation of the Fundamental Law. – 4.2. Progressive or two-step constitution-making process. – 4.3. Enactment of a new constitution. – 5. Conclusion.

It seems to be a reasonable assumption that the systemic violation of the rule of law in Hungary that has been strongly criticized by the European Union can only be remedied by a new ruling majority after the (potential) fall of the Orbán government. However, the question is whether the new governing coalition formed by the current opposition parties can put in place any significant changes in case it does not have a constitutional majority in the National Assembly. This article aims to summarize the most pertinent views voiced by Hungarian lawyers on this topic by focusing on the following three issues: (i) the desirability or the necessity of a potential change of regime after the 2022 elections, (ii) the possible legal bases of deviating from the written rules on the constitution amending and constitution-making process and finally, (iii) the specific scenarios of implementing constitutional changes.